Safe and sound: an EU approach to sovereign investment. Bruegel Policy Brief 2008/08, November 2008 by Veron, Nicolas & Hendrik-Roller, Lars.
SUMMARYA growing share of inward investment into the European Union,
including but not limited to sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), will come from
countries with diverse political regimes with which Europeans may not
always see eye-to-eye. The current crisis may increase both Europe’s need
for such investment and its sensitivity to the non-economic implications.
New investor countries have incentives to refrain from political use of their
assets, as illustrated by the recently published ‘Santiago principles’ for
transparency and accountability of SWFs. But these incentives are not
powerful enough to spare Europe its own assessment of security risks
linked to new trends in foreign investment.
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The EU should proactively address the increasing likelihood of mounting
political tensions over foreign investment. It needs a comprehensive,
open and sustainable framework to address the security aspects of
foreign acquisitions, without which there is a risk of protectionist drift
that could harm the economy and
impair the integrity of the single
market. We recommend anchor-
ing the aims and mechanisms for
review of foreign investments in
a common EU legislative frame-
work, while implementation,
including security assessment of
individual investments, would
remain a national prerogative.
This new approach would enable
Europe to maintain its openness
to investment while credibly
addressing security concerns.
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SAFE AND SOUND: AN EU APPROACH TO SOVEREIGN INVESTMENT
EUROPE’S OPENNESS TO
INVESTMENT can be maintained
and increased only if its consider-
able economic benefits do not
come at the expense of fundamen-
tal security concerns. The US
responded to this challenge 20
years ago with the Exon-Florio
amendment to the Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988,
which gave the Committee on
Foreign Investment in the United
States (CFIUS) an extensive
mandate to review foreign acquisi-
tions
1. By contrast, the EU’s
approach to cross-border
investment has been dominated
by the drive to create a single
internal market. But new global
investment patterns and the
current financial and economic
turmoil are combining to increase
both the need for inward
investment and political sensitivi-
ty towards it
2. In such a context,
the ECOFIN Council’s call in March
this year for a ‘European approach
to sovereign wealth funds’
3 could
be the starting point for a broader
debate on the nexus between
foreign acquisitions and security
concerns, which is the focus of
this policy brief. 
1. A SHIFT IN INVESTMENT
PATTERNS
The global economic imbalances of
the past decade have given rise to
a significant shift in wealth
distribution. The current account
of western economies has
generally deteriorated. Emerging
countries, such as China, the Gulf
states and Russia, which until
recently played no substantial role
as international investors, have
built up large surpluses linked to
fossil-fuel production or high
savings and exports. In these
economies the state is a major
force in both economic activity
and outward investment
4. 
Related policy debates have
recently focused on sovereign
wealth funds (SWFs), but these
are only part of a larger picture.
Their aggregate size is generally
estimated at around $3 trillion in
2008 (comparable to public
pension funds in the US
5), while
the total stock of sovereign
investments from emerging
countries, including central bank
reserves, is estimated at around
$9 trillion
6. SWFs alone are esti-
mated to have quadrupled in value
between 2003 and 2007
7, and
many expect them to grow beyond
an aggregate $10 trillion over the
next few years
8, even if the present
recession prospects may slow
down this growth somewhat. Total
government surpluses available
for investment will be larger still.
The political dimension of corpo-
rate governance and investment is
not limited to state-controlled enti-
ties. To varying degrees, concerns
privatised in the 1980s and
1990s in France and Italy, US
defense contractors, Russia’s oli-
garchic conglomerates, holdings of
the Gulf states’ ruling families, or
Communist Party-linked Chinese
businesses are all examples of
economic actors that are techni-
cally part of the private sector but
that are widely considered to be
under at least the partial influence
of political authorities in their
home country. In this policy brief,
we use the phrase ‘sovereign
investment’ loosely to refer to
investment ultimately controlled
by governments, bearing in mind
that this categorisation may not
reflect a precise legal definition. 
1E. Graham & D.
Marchick, US National
Security and Foreign
Direct Investment,
Peterson Institute,
2006.
2In the US context, this
tension was vividly
summarised by Jim
Cramer, host of Mad
Money on CNBC on 17
January 2008: “Do we
want the communists
to own the banks, or
the terrorists? I’ll take
any of it, I guess,
because we’re so
desperate.”
3Conclusions of the
ECOFIN Council of
4 March 2008.
4The share of the state
in GDP has been esti-
mated at above 80
percent in the United
Arab Emirates, 35
percent in Russia and
29 percent in China,
compared with typically
less than 10 percent in
developed countries.
Sources: CIA World
Factbook 2008; EBRD;
China’s National Bureau
of Statistics, World
Bank Bureaucrats in
Business Database
1971-1991.
5Pensions &
Investment 1000
Report, January 2008.
New investment patterns change
political balances. An in-depth
geopolitical analysis is beyond the
scope of this policy brief, but it can
be observed that many newly
cash-rich countries have different
political regimes from the
countries that previously dominat-
ed international investment. This
is illustrated using country scoring
by Freedom House, a respected
US-based NGO that publishes an
annual assessment of all
countries as ‘free’, ‘partly free’, or
‘not free’. Since first publication in
1973, EU countries have always
been ‘free’. Using current-account
surpluses as a measure of poten-
tial outward investment, Figure 1
illustrates how countries not clas-
sified ‘free’ have recently become
significant potential international
investors. 
In spite of the dearth of relevant
data
9, these trends seem to be mir-
rored by actual investments. ‘Free’
countries no longer hold the bulk
of foreign assets
10. Foreign direct
investment (FDI) from countries
not classified ‘free’ to the EU15
(EU members before 2004)
reached an all-time high of nearly
$14 billion in 2006
11. 
These findings echo a broader
global rebalancing of economic
power. Figure  2 illustrates that a
growing share of world GDP, and of
headquarters of the world’s largest
listed companies, is accounted for
by countries not classified ‘free’,
even though their rise is less
spectacular than that of current-
account surpluses. 
Developments in the years to
come will depend on a number of
factors, including fossil-fuel prices,
exchange rates, growth andSAFE AND SOUND: AN EU APPROACH TO SOVEREIGN INVESTMENT
b
r
u
e
g
e
l
p
o
l
i
c
y
b
r
i
e
f 03
Share of countries not classified 'free'
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
80%
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
2
Aggregate current- account surpluses
World GDP (actual to 2007)
World GDP (IMF forecast)
Market value of FT Global 500
companies
Figure 2: The changing distribution
of global economic power
Sources: IMF; FT Global 500 rankings (as of 30
September of each year), www.ft.com;
Freedom House; authors’ calculations, assum-
ing unchanged political regimes in the forecast
years from their scoring in 2008.
6This in turn compares
to $28 trillion for
pension funds world-
wide, $26 trillion for
mutual funds, $19 tril-
lion for insurance
assets, and $2.8 trillion
for the sum of private
equity and hedge
funds. D. Farrell, S. Lund
& K. Sadan, The New
Power Brokers,
McKinsey Global
Institute, July 2008.
7Testimony of Scott
Alvarez (Federal
Reserve Board) before
the US House
Committee on Financial
Services, 5 March 2008.
8eg Stephen Jen, How
big couldsovereign
wealth funds be by
2015?, Morgan Stanley,
3 May 2007; Steffen
Kern, Sovereign wealth
funds – state
investment on the rise,
Deutsche Bank
Research, 10
September 2007.
9See US Government
Accountability Office,
Sovereign Wealth
Funds: Publicly
Available Data on Sizes
and Investments for
Some Funds Are
Limited, 
September 2008.
10Brad Setser,
Sovereign Wealth and
Sovereign Power,
Council on Foreign
Relations, September
2008 (Figure 9).
11Source: OECD.
savings and political changes, all
of which will be affected by the
financial crisis. But in virtually all
scenarios, countries not classified
‘free’ will continue for the foresee-
able future to have significant
financial capacity for international
investment.
2. EUROPE’S OPPORTUNITIES
AND RISKS
The rise of investment from
countries with different political
regimes is largely an opportunity
for Europe. Cross-border
investment creates a powerful
alignment of interests between
such countries and the EU, which
could play a big role in defusing
potential tensions. Sovereign
investment could also have a sta-
bilising effect if it is long term-
oriented and insensitive to market
volatility, even though evidence to
this effect remains controversial
12.
In any case, Europe’s ability to
attract investment will be of
particular value in the years to
come in the context of possibly
severe economic hardship.
But there are also new risks for
Europe. Then Trade Commissioner
Peter Mandelson expressed this at
an OECD conference on 28 March
2008:
“Why are we having this debate
at all? Looking coolly at the question
the answer is – and I will put this as
diplomatically as possible – that the
biggest new funds are in economies
which have raised some sensitivi-
ties in our own politics. No one is
worried about Norway's plans for
global domination. Chinese
investment vehicles and the Russian
stabilisation fund on the other hand
are new investors, with huge
reserves, backed by governments
with mixed democratic credentials,
substantial foreign policy projection
and no track record as investors.”
Two broad categories of concern
can be distinguished: ‘macro’ risk,
or the possibility that entire
economies might be disrupted by
the actions of sovereign investors;
and ‘micro’ risk, or the possibility
that individual acquisitions might
be abused for political purposes.
Our choice to focus on the latter in
this policy brief should not be
understood as playing down the
‘macro’ risk category, which is too
serious a possibility to be dis-
missed, even if there are only few
examples of it in history
13 and the
EU may be less vulnerable than
other economies. ‘Macro’ risk from
sovereign investment merits
extensive future policy research,
which should obviously be linked
with the broader policy debate on
financial stability as it unfolds
from the ongoing financial crisis. 
The ‘micro’ security risk tends to
be smaller than perceived in many
European countries, where acqui-
sitions by non-western actors are
often attributed to dark motives.
The vast majority of foreign
investments are innocuous
14.
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SAFE AND SOUND: AN EU APPROACH TO SOVEREIGN INVESTMENT
BOX 1: A FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING RISK FROM FOREIGN ACQUISITIONS
The potential threats that a foreign acquisition of a US company might pose fall into three categories.
• The first category of threat is that the proposed acquisition would make the United States dependent upon a
foreign-controlled supplier of goods or services crucial to the functioning of the US economy (including, but
not exclusively, the functioning of the defense industrial base) who might delay, deny, or place conditions
upon provision of those goods or services.
• The second category of threat is that the proposed acquisition would allow transfer of technology or other
expertise to a foreign-controlled entity that might be deployed by the entity or its government in a manner
harmful to US national interests.
• The third category of threat is that the proposed acquisition would allow insertion of some potential capabili-
ty for infiltration, surveillance, or sabotage – via a human agent, or non-human agent – into the provision of
goods or services crucial to the functioning of the US economy (including, but not exclusively, the function-
ing of the defense industrial base).
Quoted from Theodore H. Moran, ‘Three Threats: An Analytical Framework for the CFIUS Process’, unpublished
draft, Peterson Institute for International Economics, forthcoming 2009. 
12See for example
Brad Setser:
Follow the Money
(blogs.cfr.org/setser).
13Benn Steil & Robert E.
Litan, Financial
Statecraft: The Role of
Financial Markets in
American Foreign
Policy, Yale University
Press, 2006.
14John Kay, ‘Sovereign
wealth is a force for sta-
bility’, Financial Times,
27 February 2008.
15International Working
Group of Sovereign
Wealth funds, ‘Santiago
Principles’,
October 2008
(www.iwg-swf.org).
However, some risks can be real,
especially when the market power
or access resulting from an acqui-
sition can be abused by the
government that controls the
acquirer. In particular, harm can be
inflicted or influence exerted in
order to advance political or redis-
tributional goals. Box 1 shows a
classification of how such risks
might emerge. It is taken from the
US context, but it could equally
apply to the EU. Europe currently
has friendly relations with most of
the world, but scenarios of future
political tension with major invest-
ing countries could include, to
name only three, crises with
Russia over Ukraine, with China
over Taiwan, or with Gulf states in
the event of their overthrow by
forces hostile to the west, as hap-
pened in Iran in 1979.
A counterpart to the potential
security risk is the risk of
protectionist drift. In the US, the
proposed takeover of Unocal by
China National Offshore Oil
Corporation (2005) and the pur-
chase of US port facilities by Dubai
Ports World (2006) were memo-
rable cases. Europe offers fertile
ground for protectionist sentiment
because of its historical legacy of
wars and state intervention.
Figure 3 shows the frequency of
use of the word ‘protectionism’ in
the press in three major western
languages. The curves show short-
term fluctuations from specific
news events, but also a marked
step-up in the ‘floor’ level, which
roughly doubles in 2005 com-
pared to the previous ten years.
Remarkably, this effect is simulta-
neous in the three languages.
Protectionism has never been
absent from Europe, but this rough
indicator would suggest its pres-
ence in public discussion has
increased in step with the emer-
gence of countries not classified
‘free’ on the global economic stage,
as detailed in the previous section. 
Protectionism can create its own
security risks. The US veto to
CNOOC’s acquisition of Unocal may
have contributed to persuading
the Chinese leadership that US
advocacy of an open global market
for fossil fuels is insincere and that
what counts is direct ownership of
reserves, a belief that is plainly not
in US security interests. But the
most obvious negative effect of
protectionism is the economic
harm it inflicts on countries that
adopt it. Moreover, in Europe
national protectionism threatens
the single market, and thus is of
concern for the entire EU. And his-
torical experience suggests that
when protectionism is embraced
in one country, it tends to shift the
political balance towards protec-
tionism in neighbouring countries
as well.
The security risk from foreign
investment and the risk of
protectionist drift are at least to
some extent negatively linked.
Complete investment autarky would
eliminate the security risk at enor-
mous economic cost; unrestricted
openness to foreign investment
leaves the security risk unchecked.SAFE AND SOUND: AN EU APPROACH TO SOVEREIGN INVESTMENT
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16Only six months ago
the president of the
China Investment
Corporation commented
about calls for increas-
ing SWF transparency
requirements: “Why do
you need a law like
that? That law will only
hurt feelings. It is not
economic. It does not
make sense. Politically
it is stupid”, and the
head of the Kuwait
Investment Authority
said: “Recipient
countries are placing
handcuffs on sovereign
wealth funds in the
form of regulations
termed – in the best
traditions of George
Orwell’s Newspeak –
‘codes of conduct’ or
‘principles of operation’
or ‘best practices’.
These regulations will
not solve or prevent
any future financial
crises”. Sources: inter-
view with Gao Xiqing on
‘60 Minutes’, CBS, 6
April 2008; A. Newton,
‘The Politics of
Sovereign Wealth: An
Overview’, Lehman
Brothers, 10 April 2008.
17S. Schwarzman,
‘Reject sovereign
wealth funds at your
peril’, Financial Times,
19 June 2008.
18European
Commission, ‘A com-
mon European
approach to Sovereign
Wealth Funds’,
27 February 2008.
Between these extremes lies a
thorny policy trade-off.
3. THE PERSPECTIVE OF INVESTING
COUNTRIES
In general, sovereign investment
in recent years has not raised
security concerns , with the possi-
ble exception of Russian acquisi-
tions of a stake in EADS in 2006
and of energy companies in east-
ern Europe. The investments by
SWFs in several large banks in late
2007 and 2008 have benefited
western economies by providing
temporary relief to a strained
banking system. Some sovereign
investors, such as the Government
of Singapore Investment
Corporation, have attracted high
respect for their professionalism. 
Indeed, there are powerful incen-
tives for sovereign investors not to
take initiatives that might stoke
security concerns. Given the size
and growth of their assets, and
their long-term horizon, they need
continued access to recipient
countries’ markets and are careful
not to attract criticism. This was
illustrated when a group of 26
investing countries recently
adopted a set of ‘generally accept-
ed principles and practices’ –
known as the Santiago principles
– with coordination provided by
the International Monetary Fund
15.
Given strong initial doubts about
such common norms in some
countries
16, the adoption of these
principles demonstrates the
strength of the incentives for coop-
eration. Together with ongoing dis-
cussion at the OECD, they embody
the hope of a ‘grand bargain’ in
which foreign investment is
accepted  in return for a pledge of
‘good behaviour’.
economic incentives to accept
‘rules of the game’, they can
also have political, economic or
financial incentives not to.
Politics sometimes runs con-
trary to economic interest, as
was shown when Russia’s inva-
sion of Georgia in August 2008
contributed to wiping hundreds
of billions of euros off domestic
equity wealth. Also, sovereign
investors’ legitimate willing-
ness to maximise investment
returns can frustrate recipients’
wishes for, say, specific disclo-
sures
18 or restrictions on direct
investment in companies
19, on
the size of equity stakes
20, on
the exercise of shareholder
rights
21, or on the use of deriva-
tives and leverage. Figure  5
(overleaf) illustrates how long-
term investors generally tend to
diversify asset allocation over
time. Sovereign investors are
likely gradually to expand into
the full range of investment
possibilities, including direct
equity stakes and all sorts of
alternative investments
22. 
However, three important factors
limit the scope for such a bargain
and suggest that the correspon-
ding discussions will not eliminate
all recipient countries’ security
concerns. 
• Emerging sovereign investors
may find it politically difficult to
meet developed countries’ cri-
teria for governance and
accountability if these run con-
trary to features of their domes-
tic system. In regimes where a
single family or party controls
virtually all institutions, it is
unreasonable to expect a state
fund’s operations to be truly
independent. In such a context,
transparency can create prob-
lems of its own, specifically
where ties to the west are con-
troversial and not well accepted
in the body politic
17. Figure  4
(overleaf) shows there is a
strong correlation between SWF
transparency and the respec-
tive countries’ political regime. 
• While investing countries have
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• Developed economies’ leverage
to impose and enforce desired
standards on sovereign
investors is limited. True, they
represent around four-fifths of
global financial assets
23. But
they are unlikely to maintain a
common restrictive front given
that each of them wants to
attract investment; and any
rules imposed unilaterally
would be resented as patronis-
ing by emerging investing
countries, many of which are
former European colonies, and
would ultimately prove counter-
productive. Moreover, even
when common norms are
accepted, as with the Santiago
principles, enforcement will
remain dependent on each
country’s goodwill and is likely
to be imperfect.
Specifically, the idea that sover-
eign investment in the EU should
be subject to a condition of reci-
procity
24, while seductive, should
not be pursued. Because many
reforms cannot be forced on
emerging countries whose levels
of economic development remain
diverse and different from those of
recipient countries, the main
effect of reciprocity would likely be
to import legal uncertainty and
suboptimal practices from less
developed economies into the EU.
Overall, it seems reasonable to
hope that sovereign investors will
make progress towards more
transparency, but this progress
will be gradual and incomplete, its
pace will vary among countries,
and it will not eliminate recipient
countries’ concerns about their
security
26. 
4. POLICY OPTIONS FOR EUROPE
As the crisis reinforces the need
for Europe to attract foreign
investment, it also may exacer-
bate defensiveness and economic
nationalism
27. In this context,
Europeans need credible policy
instruments of their own to ensure
that inward investment does not
put their security at risk. The EU’s
trade and competition policies,
which are sensibly designed to
address economic concerns only,
19Lawrence Summers,
‘Funds that shake capi-
talist logic’, Financial
Times, 29 July 2007.
20Philipp Hildebrandt,
‘The Challenge of
Sovereign Wealth
Funds’, speech on 18
December 2007 (on
www.snb.ch).
21Evan Bayh, ‘Time for
Sovereign Wealth
Rules’, Wall Street
Journal,
13 February 2008.
22Knut Kjaer, “Do not
regulate wealth funds,
improve them”,
Financial Times,
13 April 2008.
23McKinsey Global
Institute, Mapping
Global Capital Markets,
January 2008.
24See for example Alain
Demarolle, Report to the
French Government on
Sovereign Wealth
Funds, May 2008.
25Edwin M. Truman, A
Blueprint for Sovereign
Wealth Fund Best
Practices, Peterson
Institute, April 2008.
26W. Miracky et al,
Assessing the Risks:
the behaviors of sover-
eign wealth funds in
the global economy,
Monitor Group,
June 2008.
27Martin Wolf, ‘Financial
crisis tests durability of
globalisation’,
Financial Times,
10 October 2008.SAFE AND SOUND: AN EU APPROACH TO SOVEREIGN INVESTMENT
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Euroworld 2015: A
European Strategy for
Globalisation, report to
the French Government,
April 2008.
cannot and should not be used to
address security concerns. We
identify three main requirements
for the corresponding policy
framework: 
• It should be open, and ensure
that the EU remains among the
world’s most attractive places
in the global competition for
capital. Any investment review
proceedings must offer legal
predictability (including
through guarantees that the
security objective is not
invoked for non-security
motives), due process, and
empowered jurisdictions.
• It should be comprehensiveand
credibly address the whole
gamut of potential security
risks, in the defence and securi-
ty industry but also potentially
in other sectors crucial to the
functioning of the economy,
including some energy facilities
and critical physical and/or
electronic infrastructure.
• It should be sustainable and
provide a stable framework for
policy. Steadiness is required
both because of the need for
long-term predictability, an
essential factor of attractive-
ness to investment, and
because political tensions from
sovereign investment are more
likely to increase than decrease
in the near future. 
We consider that these three
requirements are broadly met by
the CFIUS framework in the US, and
by legislation in some EU
countries. But looking at the EU as
a whole, they are not fulfilled. The
openness criterion is not met,
since the diversity of national
approaches to foreign investment
is a barrier to the internal market
in the defence/security industry.
Current policies also fail to address
the security risk comprehensively,
as in many member states there is
no consistent framework to review
foreign investment outside of the
defence industry. This gap can be
exploited by populist politicians to
push for protectionist moves or
the abuse of other regulatory
instruments, including in cases
where no real security risk exists.
Moreover, national frameworks fail
to address cross-border security
spillovers that arise in an integrat-
ed EU market: for example, if a
contractor in one European coun-
try critically depends on a near-
monopoly supplier from another
European country, then a foreign
takeover of the latter may have
security implications for the for-
mer’s home country, and the
review process should allow ade-
quate coordination. Finally,
current policies are not
sustainable. Many current
investment control regimes are
legacies of the cold war, a time
when virtually all FDI came from
long-term allies. These do not pro-
vide a stable policy framework in
the current investment context, as
is evidenced by a flurry of legisla-
tive initiatives since 2005 in
countries including France,
Germany and Greece. 
To improve the policy framework
for the review of foreign
investment in Europe, three
options can logically be envisaged.
The first option consists of specific
legislation and implementation in
each member state, as is currently
the case. A second option would
involve common legislation at the
EU level, with implementation
(review of actual acquisitions)
carried out at national level. A third
option would consist of EU-level
legislation and implementation,
the latter by the Commission or a
newly created ad hoc EU agency. 
The first option’s above-mentioned
shortcomings are only likely to
worsen over time, because of the
probable increase in protectionist
tendencies in many member
states as a reaction to the chang-
ing global investment patterns,
and in spite of the countervailing
incentives to loosen controls aris-
ing from regulatory competition to
attract inward investment. The
third, federalist option has been
advocated
28 but we see it as unre-
alistic and undesirable in the
current make-up of EU political
institutions. It appears to us that
neither the European Commission
nor any other EU institution can be
entrusted with ultimate responsi-
bility for security assessments,
now or in the foreseeable future.
Unlike essentially economic
policies such as trade and
competition, security policy
involves a broad range of consider-
ations which cannot in practice be
delegated by national govern-
ments to the EU. 
The second option better reflects
the policy trade-off highlighted at
the end of Section  2. It could take
the form of an internal market
directive (Article 95 of the Treaty)
establishing a framework and
process for the security review by
member states of foreign acquisi-
tions within the EU. The objective
should be limited to ‘hard’ security,
both national security of the coun-
try in which the investment takes
place and security of the EU as a
whole. The scope should beb
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purchases of assets resulting in
transfer of their ultimate control to
non-EU investors, when this trans-
fer creates a credible risk to securi-
ty. Under the Treaty’s provisions on
free movement of capital,
investments with no impact on
corporate control would not be
included in the scope. Nor should
there be discrimination against
state-owned investors.
Governments should commit to
adapt existing national security-
related investment
control regimes to
the new framework.
The legislation
should set out rules
of due process,
including on the
maximum duration
of the investment review; a defini-
tion of what is considered ‘control’
and how it should be assessed;
and a framework for the negotia-
tion of ‘mitigation agreements’, or
modifications to be made to acqui-
sitions in order to render them
compatible with the security
objective. It should create an EU
committee, possibly coordinated
by the High Representative for the
Common Foreign and Security
Policy, to ensure mutual informa-
tion and coordination, especially
in cases of cross-border security
spillover even though the ultimate
decision would remain with the rel-
evant member state. Appeal would
be possible to the court system,
including the European Court of
Justice. The European Commission
could initiate infringement
procedures if a government’s prac-
tice is found to be in breach of the
Treaties. 
Such EU legislation would provide
a robust anchor to prevent the pro-
liferation of ill-coordinated nation-
al control regimes. It may be
argued that the legislative process
to adopt it risks being derailed,
resulting in a more restrictive
investment frame-
work than the one we
advocate. To address
this risk, EU leaders
should start the
process by solemnly
committing to open-
ness towards foreign
investment and
emphasising the legislation’s
focus on ‘hard’ security, which
minimises the possibility of its use
for other purposes. The
legislation’s wording should not
allow member states to block
acquisitions which make business
sense and entail no security risk
such as, say, the purchase of
Arcelor by Mittal Steel in early
2006, which several EU govern-
ments tried but failed to impede. 
There are obviously other possible
dimensions to a European
approach to sovereign investment.
More stringent transparency
requirements on all (sovereign
and other) investors in public equi-
ty, as well as active competition
policy and, more generally,
policies that encourage more
vibrancy of European markets
would also constitute appropriate
responses. That said, the frame-
work we propose for the review of
foreign investment would be a key
step for the EU to adapt to the new
multipolar investment world, in
which diverse political regimes co-
exist. Europe’s response must be
grounded in economic openness
and legal predictability. The US had
this policy debate in the 1980s. Its
response, the CFIUS process under
the 1988 Exon-Florio legislation, is
certainly not perfect. But it has
effectively contributed to America
remaining one of the world’s most
attractive economies for foreign,
including sovereign, investors, and
it has remained essentially
unchanged in spite of dramatic
geopolitical changes since its
inception.
In the EU, denying the possibility
of security risks arising from
foreign investment would be a
poor way to defend economic
openness. It is now time for Europe
to tackle this difficult policy area,
in which economic and strategic
viewpoints must be combined to
sustain an open investment
environment. 
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‘Denying the
possibility of security
risks would be a poor
way to defend
economic openness.’
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